The 2010 Microfinance Crisis in Andhra Pradesh, India and its Implications for Microfinance in India by Saxena, Shruti
Reconsidering Development
Volume 3
Issue 1 The Market Article 1
2014
The 2010 Microfinance Crisis in Andhra Pradesh,
India and its Implications for Microfinance in India
Shruti Saxena
saxen032@umn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://pubs.lib.umn.edu/reconsidering
Reconsidering Development is published by the University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.
Recommended Citation
Saxena, S. (2014). The 2010 Microfinance Crisis in Andhra Pradesh, India and its Implications for Microfinance in India. Reconsidering
Development, 3 (1). Retrieved from http://pubs.lib.umn.edu/reconsidering/vol3/iss1/1
	  56	  
	  
  
This article is available online at ReconsideringDevelopment.org  
      
   
 The 2010 Microfinance Crisis in Andhra Pradesh, India 
and its Implications for Microfinance in India  
       
Volume 3 
	  1
08	  Fall	  
Abstract: This paper looks at the trajectory followed by microfinance in India and 
specifically focuses on the state of Andhra Pradesh. In 2010 a law by the state government of 
Andhra Pradesh halted operations of private microfinance organizations in the state, 
adversely impacting their recovery and liquidity. This crisis, although not wholly 
unexpected, still shook the industry both in the state and across the country. This paper 
analyzes the impact of the crisis specifically on Andhra Pradesh and in general on the 
industry in India and provides recommendations for the way ahead, both for the government 
via the regulatory route and microfinance organizations in their operations. Once considered 
to be an ideal development strategy, microfinance has lost much of its sheen in recent years 
and is increasingly under fire.  
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Introduction 
 
The advent of microfinance is considered to mark a new frontier in development strategy. As 
the concept of microfinance emerged in the eighties, it was seen as a panacea for poverty. Its 
focus on women further enhanced its attractiveness as a model. After its formal recognition as a 
model of development in the mid seventies, development agencies and governments alike paid 
it increasing attention leading to widespread adoption across countries. Mohammad Yunus, 
hailed as the ‘Father of microfinance’ (Goldstein, 2011), is famous for declaring that with 
microfinance, the only place we would see poverty would be in a poverty museum (Yunus, 
2006). At the other end of the spectrum critics such as Milford Bateman maintain that focusing 
on microfinance undermines other more effective poverty reduction strategies such as provision 
of basic services such as health and education (Bateman & Chang, 2012).  
 
This paper focuses on the trajectory of microfinance in a specific state in India – Andhra 
Pradesh (AP) – where microfinance is seen to have been greatly successful by supporters of the 
concept of microfinance. Two microfinance models prevail in India: one led by the government 
and the second by private organizations, several of which are headquartered in AP. Client and 
loan numbers in AP exceeded the national average. However, this did not prevent the industry 
from being on the brink of a crisis in 2006, of microfinance organizations being accused of using 
predatory practices leading to client suicides, and subsequently grinding to a screeching halt as 
the interests of various stakeholders clashed in 2010. On one hand it effectively shut down 
operations of the organizations and thus access of the poor in AP to microfinance; on the other 
it seemingly provided relief to clients who were being harassed by microfinance organizations 
and had little to no power to prevent this. 
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Since then a significant amount of research has analyzed what went wrong, and who is to 
blame: private microfinance institutions (MFIs) or the government or both? Organizations 
have been accused of being mercenary and profiteering on the backs of India’s poor, while the 
government was under fire for trying to promote its own interests and schemes. A succinct, if 
not eloquent, summary of the situation was that “Micro-finance in India has become a macro-
mess.” (Arunachalam, 2011, p. 14). 
 
This article presents the origins and evolution of microfinance in India, and analyzes the crisis 
in AP in 2010, focusing on the actions of private MFIs and the consequences of these actions 
and the crisis on various stakeholders. Finally, it provides recommendations for the 
microfinance industry in India to make its operations more transparent, ethical and sustainable. 
The case in AP represents a bubble that is not altogether uncommon in microfinance, and 
lessons from this crisis can at the very least inform national microfinance practices in India. 
 
Microfinance: Tracing its Evolution 
 
To understand the evolution of microfinance, it is important to understand that the aftermath 
of the Second World War was when a plethora of development approaches were being 
implemented for former colonies. Microfinance as a concept found its feet during a time when 
the world was reeling from the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and oil crises. Growth 
was not trickling down to the poor as initially hoped for. The origins of microfinance are in no 
small part related to the failures of governments across the world to develop inclusive financial 
models.  
 
Modern microfinance owes much to the Grameen Bank model, set up in Bangladesh by Nobel 
Laureate Dr. Mohammad Yunus. He gave small loans to women in the village of Jobra, 
Bangladesh during a famine to help them escape from the clutches of moneylenders. The idea of 
providing small loans to poor people without collateral took the form of Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh, and was institutionalized in the eighties and nineties in several countries.  
Historical records show, however, that the concept of small loans has existed since the 1800s. 
These have taken different forms: ‘tontines’ in West Africa, ‘tandas’ or ‘cundina’ in Mexico and 
Central America, ‘chit funds’ in India (Krieger, 2006). The idea of lending small sums of money 
to the poor to help them undertake entrepreneurial ventures is not new. Grameen Bank’s 
innovation lay in institutionalizing microfinance and involving the government, which gave the 
model further legitimacy. 
 
The word Grameen has its roots in “gram”, which means rural or village in Bengali language. 
Grameen Bank translates to the village bank (Grameen Bank, 1998). The bank started in 1976 
with the loans given by Dr. Yunus, and became an independent bank in 1983 through a special 
ordinance passed by the government based on the success of the model. The Grameen Bank 
model operates on the belief that loans are better than charity and poor people are capable of 
repayment if given a chance. It has a solidarity lending model, with groups of five people being 
formed. While loans are taken by individuals, repayment is the responsibility of the entire 
group and is based on trust and group pressure. Collateral is not required, and a majority of 
participants are women. The success of the bank in Bangladesh generated great interest the 
world over, and is the basis of several MFIs across the world.  
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The seventies and eighties also saw micro lending in other parts of the world.  Acción, started 
work on community development projects in Venezuela in the 1960s, then provided microloans 
in Brazil and subsequently expanded in Latin America and other parts of the world.  
In India, Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA) registered itself as a trade union in 
1972, and realized the difficulty women face in accessing capital. It then set up what is seen as 
the first microfinance bank in India: Shri Mahila Sewa Sahakari Bank Ltd.  
 
While microfinance may have existed before the seventies, it was not a unified approach. The 
success of the Grameen Bank model piqued the interest of organizations such as the United 
Nations and World Bank. Structural Adjustment Programs were not having the intended 
impact on growth for developing countries and microfinance was appealing on several fronts. It 
was seen as a solution that would allow the poor to channel their entrepreneurial talents, 
acceptable to both development and neoliberal agenda. Formal financial institutions were not 
reaching out to the poor, leading to exclusion, and microfinance was seen as a way out of this.  
The United Nations declared 2005 as the International Year for Microcredit with a motto of 
“Building inclusive financial sectors to achieve the Millennium Development Goals” 
(Globalization101, 2005). The millennial decade saw an increase in the number and reach of 
MFIs across the world. There was euphoria around microfinance’s ability to lift people out of 
poverty. The model worked as far as the financial aspect was concerned because borrowers, 
typically women, ensured very high rates of repayment, and interest rates covered the high 
transaction costs that had deterred the formal sector. 
 
In 2007-08 growth in the sector slowed down and was initially seen to be a consequence of the 
financial crisis. But subsequent analyses and a series of localized crises highlighted internal 
weaknesses in the sector including predatory recovery methods, agents aggressively pushing 
loans to meet targets, which are not unknown practices in the microfinance industry across the 
world. Critics were increasingly questioning the impact microfinance was having on poverty 
alleviation and it was no longer the unquestioned path out of poverty. In 2011 a UK 
government-funded study (Copestake, et al., 2011) showed that there was no identifiable impact 
in the last 30 years. Milford Bateman—whose work has focused on Small and Medium 
Enterprise development policy, access to local finance issues, and the role of the ‘local 
developmental state’—has repeatedly questioned the validity of impact evaluations done by 
MFIs and their supporters whose interests are closely tied to MFIs (Bateman & Chang, 2012).  
 
Origins of Microfinance in India 
 
Over a quarter of India’s population lives below the poverty line (United Nations Development 
Program, 2011). 58.7 per cent households are availing banking services in the country 
(Ministry of Home Affairs, Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, 2012) 
but a significant proportion of households are still outside the ambit of formal financial services 
(Banking in deficit, 2013). The neglect of the poor by the formal banking sector is not new or 
unique to India; it is symptomatic of the system’s inability to deal with the unique challenges 
posed by small transactions, high volumes of transactions, limited or no collateral, and lack of 
physical infrastructure.  
 
For several decades after independence in India, the poor and rural populations have been 
largely ignored by the financial sector, even as the government regulated priority lending to 
direct credit to the poor and rural populations. The gap between demand and supply was 
fulfilled through a variety of sources: primarily the moneylender, who charged usurious rates of 
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interests, but also occasionally through local saving clubs. Until the formal advent of 
microfinance, it seemed as if the poor were destined to a lifetime of financial exclusion.  
 
The roots of microfinance in India can be traced to SEWA Bank. However, the 
institutionalization and spread of microfinance in India began when the National Bank of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) started promoting the Self Help Group (SHG) 
model to deliver financial services to the poor. Microfinance in India started as a state-driven 
effort in the late eighties and subsequently private players saw it as a lucrative sector, where 
large amounts of profits could be made from an aggregate of small loans, and stepped in. Their 
participation greatly increased the size and scope of the sector and also slowly changed the 
operations of the industry. The two models prevalent in India are Self Help Group Bank 
Linkage (SHG BL) model and through private microfinance institutions based on the Grameen 
Bank model (also known as Joint Liability Group model – JLG).  
 
Table 1. Salient features of the SHG BL and JLG models. 
 
Salient Features 
SHG BL model 
• Groups started with 10-20 women who pool savings 
• This is regulated by NABARD 
• After six months, the group is eligible for credit from banks or other MFIS.  
• These are independent groups, and usually promoted by a non-profit organization 
 
JLG model 
• Groups formed with five members, which aggregated as a center. A village may have 
multiple centers.  
• Most organizations here fall outside regulatory purview 
• Interest rates were higher than those charged by banks (these were estimated to range 
between 25-100% (Kumar, 2010) 
• Repayments are made on a weekly basis and ensured through peer monitoring 
 
The SHG BL model was promoted by NABARD, at first as an action research initiative and 
subsequently through refinance and promotional support to banks. The number and scope of 
private MFIs grew in the latter half of nineties. The growth of microfinance is evident from the 
following numbers: In 2004, there were 188 million microfinance accounts in India (Christen & 
Rosenberg, 2004). In 2008, India experienced a 65% borrower growth rate (The Microbanking 
Bulletin, 2009). At the end of 2010, India possessed the largest, most concentrated microfinance 
industry in the world (Ani, 2010).  
 
Case Study: Microfinance in Andhra Pradesh 
 
AP is part of the region known as South India, which also includes states of Karnataka, Kerala 
and Tamil Nadu as well as the union territories of Lakshadweep and Puducherry. It is India's 
fourth largest state by area and fifth largest by population (Ministry of Home Affairs, Office of 
the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, 2012).  
 
State of Microfinance in Andhra Pradesh 
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Microfinance in India has originated and grown mostly in South India and AP is a key state. 
This is evident if we look at financial results for both models of microfinance in the region. At 
the end of March 2013, the average savings balance of SHGs was the highest for South India, at 
USD 294 for Karnataka closely trailed by AP. The quantum of bank loans given to SHGs is 
also highest for South India: the average amount is USD 2761 and for South India this is 
greater than USD 3271 (Status of Microfinance in India: 2012-13, 2013). On 31 March 2013, 
AP had the maximum number of SHGs in the country (1,421,393) with savings of USD 415 
billion and loans from banks to the tune of USD 1825 billion (see Appendix 1 for details).  
 
In 2010, more than a third of the 30 million households using microcredit in India, were in AP 
(Biswas, 2010). Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) is one of the largest 
financiers of MFIs in India and its yearly portfolio increase as a proportion of the previous 
year’s lending portfolio rose from 51.5% in 2005 to 146.09% in 2006 and was 124.85% in 2009: 
all these reflect tremendous increase in volumes (see Appendix 2 for further details). 
It is important to understand that these numbers reflect a policy signal from the Reserve Bank 
of India (RBI), the apex bank in India. In November 2002 RBI allowed commercial banks to 
treat unsecured loans and advances to SHGs at par with secured advances. In 2004 it allowed 
lending to microfinance operations through intermediaries to be part of priority sector lending 
as well. These policies led to commercial banks choosing to access the microfinance market 
both through SHGs and intermediaries, and achieving their priority sector targets. It is 
estimated in 2005 banks had given loans of USD 0.23 billion to SHGs and in all USD 2.29 
billion (including other groups, NGOs and SHGs). In December 2012, the amount for loans 
was at USD 4.9 billion for SHGs and NGOs each (MS Sriram, 2012).  
 
The SHG model was promoted by the state government and ensured that people were familiar 
with the concept of microfinance and group liability. Another important state government 
initiative was a World Bank initiated program called Velugu in the beginning and now Indira 
Kranthi Pratham, to promote SHGs and livelihoods. With the potential to be used as a model 
for other Indian states, a lot was at stake for the AP government to ensure the program 
succeeds. No action by the state government escapes the speculation that the government was 
targeting its own political (and possibly economic) interests more than those of its citizens. By 
entering the microfinance space, the government has effectively made itself a competitor in an 
industry where it was also a regulator, a clear conflict of interest. 
 
Evolution of the Crisis 
 
In 2006 the first signs of trouble in microfinance in AP surfaced. Termed ‘Krishna crisis’ after 
the district Krishna where it took place, this occurred when the state government shutdown 50 
branches of two large MFIs – Share and Spandana. The government alleged that these 
organizations charged excessive interest rates from clients, followed abusive recovery practices 
and stole clients from the government-led SHG program and cited these as reasons for 
shutting the organizations down. While the shutdown harmed lending and recovery cycles, it 
had limited impact and was averted fairly quickly. However, the private MFIs had received a 
scare and grouped together to have more bargaining power, promising yet again to implement 
voluntary regulation. Sa-Dhan, an industry association for MFIs set up in 1999, called for 
developing a voluntary code of conduct in wake of the Krishna crisis. This code was adopted by 
the MFIs, which also promised to reduce interest rates. In 2009 Microfinance Institutions 
Network (MFIN) was established for NBFC MFIs. Sa-Dhan was not seen to have functioned 
62	  	  S. Saxena 
well by external observers of the industry and its efficacy was under question in the wake of 
repeated crisis. MFIN declared that its members would promote responsible lending and follow 
a code of conduct. 
 
Before the troubles started, the decade of 2000 had been a rosy one for microfinance in India. 
Vikram Akula, promoter of SKS Microfinance, enjoyed a period of great fame as the face of 
microfinance. SKS Microfinance was the first organization to reach the Indian capital market 
through an Initial Public Offering in July 2010. This was an interesting turn of events 
considering that SKS Microfinance was originally a non-profit organization and it was not 
expected to take the IPO route. This was oversubscribed and the share prices rose rapidly. All 
these were seen as signs of how profitable financing the poor could be and it seemed that the 
golden age of microfinance had arrived.  
 
Not everyone shared this view though. There were dissenters who highlighted the bubble-like 
growth of the market (Rozas & Sinha, 2010). Critics also pointed towards saturation and 
possibly oversupply in the microcredit market in AP. This oversupply is believed to have been 
caused by client poaching by organizations to meet their targets and multiple lending to 
consumers (thus one consumer could be juggling loans from multiple MFIs).  
 
Reports of abusive practices by intermediary agents of private MFIs started making the news 
before any action was taken, initially in the vernacular press and subsequently national media. 
Suicides in AP are often determined by agrarian trends and are unfortunately common. 
However, in this case over 70 suicides were alleged to be linked to people’s inability to repay 
MFIs (Biswas, 2010). The state government cited these suicides as the basis for intervening to 
protect citizens from the unethical practices of private MFIs.  The Andhra Pradesh 
Microfinance Institutions (Regulation of Money Lending) Ordinance, 2010 was promulgated 
with effect from 15 October 2010 to address oversupply and coercive recovery practices.  
Some of its immediate mandates were: all MFIs had to register with the government and 
specify area in which they were operating, rate of interest charged, systems used for operation 
and recovery. Without this they could no longer carry out operations. Penalties were specified 
for organizations using coercive recovery practices. Organizations were also forbidden from 
extending multiple loans to the same borrower and a limit was prescribed on the total interest 
charged.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the ordinance, lending and recovery came to a halt. Politicians 
encouraged people to not pay back the MFIs. This had two critical effects: it adversely affected 
collections for MFIs (collection rates for organizations based in AP fell from 99% to 20% 
(Ghiyazuddin & Gupta, 2012)); and clients who did not repay their loans became ineligible for 
future loans. Liquidity for the MFIs reduced drastically as interest rates were curbed and state 
officials discouraged repayment. Commercial banks also stopped extending credit due to 
concerns about possible losses.  
 
At this stage, it is important to qualify the word crisis, used repeatedly for microfinance in AP 
and subsequently in India. This was a crisis for several reasons. First, several people killed 
themselves because they were unable to repay loans. While blame mongering has been 
significant, MFIs played a role in driving people to desperation through focusing on markets 
and efficiency and losing sight of the vision of microfinance as a pro-poor strategy. Second, this 
ordinance reduced confidence in MFIs, and caused commercial banks to question their 
exposure. While the scrutiny may have been valid, a sudden shock in a financial marketplace 
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engenders further weakness. This ordinance decreased the legitimacy of MFIs in the eyes of its 
clients and investors. Third, the state government may have helped citizens in the short-run 
but harmed their interests in the long run as they became non-viable clients. This decline in 
access to financial resources led many people back to the moneylenders. Finally, this acted as a 
catalyst for the RBI to develop much-needed regulation and policy reforms. 
 
 
 
Subsequent Developments in the Microfinance Sector in India 
 
RBI appointed the Malegam Committee in December 2010 to investigate regulation of 
microfinance institutions to understand concerns highlighted by state governments. These 
included high interest rates, coercive and unethical recovery practices such as publically 
shaming clients and showing up at their homes for collection of loans, client poaching and 
multiple lending. Some of the main recommendations made by the committee were: 
 
i. Creation of a new category of MFIs – Non Banking Financial Companies Microfinance 
Organizations (NBFC MFIs) – to ensure they are within the RBI purview 
ii. Continuing to consider lending to MFIs as priority sector but making this conditional on 
regulated lending practices 
iii. Transparency in interest rates being charged by MFIs 
iv. Stronger supervision of operation of MFIs 
v. Better governance practices for currently unregulated MFIs and stronger client 
protection 
 
The report highlighted how multiple lending was hurting the poor and creating a vicious cycle 
of debt.  The report was critiqued on several grounds: for recommending an annual family 
income cap, which many felt would lead to more corruption on ground. Capping interest rates 
and margins was seen as unfeasible. While much of the criticism is valid; the report was one of 
the most comprehensive reviews for the microfinance sector in India. 
 
In response to the Malegam Committee report, in May 2011 RBI implemented some of the 
recommendations such as prudential requirements for microfinance loans to qualify for priority 
sector status. In December 2011 it created the new recommended category of NBFC MFIs to 
regulate lending to MFIs (Vasudevan, 2012).  
 
In July 2011, the central government released a draft of the ‘Micro Finance Institutions 
(Development and Regulation) Bill’. This bill’s objective is to provide a national regulatory 
framework for MFIs in India, with the main authority with RBI. This bill will replace 
individual state regulations as a nationally enforceable policy, and is currently awaiting 
parliamentary approval. Salient features of this bill include regulating margins charged by 
organizations, recovery methods, locations for operations. It also allows for partial relegation of 
responsibility to NABARD.  
 
MFIs are favorable to a unified bill but the state governments have voiced their disapproval as 
national practices may be difficult to implement and may not always be suited for the local 
context. This bill was introduced in Lok Sabha, the lower parliamentary house in May 2012, 
subsequently recommended to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance and finally 
rejected by it. The grounds for rejection included “the committee finds that the bill is rather 
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sketchy with inadequate groundwork and lacking in consensus, requiring wider consultations 
with stakeholders and deeper study on vital issues.” The committee also recommended setting 
up of a Micro Finance and Development Regulatory Council (MFDRC) with representatives 
from all agencies and institutions. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The microfinance industry in India has followed a fairly typical trajectory: a slow start, a 
concentrated period of high growth, a bust and a subsequent lull. It is unlikely that the 
regulatory authorities foresaw the dominant role that private MFIs would come to play in the 
sector. Similar cycles have been observed in other countries as well. The diversity of Indian 
states has been seen in the models and success of microfinance: South India is where 
microfinance is seen to have started, and it is also the region with huge numbers of loans and 
clients. But as the sector has moved away from its original vision, what Mohammad Yunus has 
termed as ‘mission drift’, (Bornstein, 2013) discontent has been evident. It is unclear whether 
this Schumpeterian cycle of creative destruction will set in motion a more stable sector.  
 
At this moment in development history, both the concept of microfinance and specific models of 
implementation are under fire. Based on my research, I would like to provide recommendations 
for two types of stakeholders, the government (including regulatory bodies) and private MFIs 
in India.  
 
Recommendations for Government & Regulatory Bodies 
First, the government needs to recognize that microfinance is built on the failure of the formal 
financial sector. It is essential for it to not lose sight of the vision of financial inclusion for all 
citizens of India. The original concept of microfinance is a truly seminal one; it gives 
opportunities for financial inclusion to people who may otherwise have none. But as 
microfinance evolves, it is important to keep questioning its efficacy and evaluating if it is the 
best investment of resources.  
 
Second, microfinance is not clearly mentioned as a subject on either the state or the central 
government list in India, which determines who will be the final authority. The center believes 
it should have the last word; states such as AP want microfinance to be a state subject. It is 
important to have a central regulating body, and not allow states to be both participants and 
regulators in the sector. In this regard, the recommendation to set up a council is a step in the 
right direction. Giving a voice to representatives from various states ensures their concerns are 
heard; however allowing each of India’s states and union territories to set up rules is certainly a 
recipe for chaos.  
 
Third, the government needs to recognize that by bringing microfinance within the ambit of 
RBI, it will give it legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens. Ensuring prudent and ethical 
operations and putting in place mechanisms to redress grievances will become even more 
important. Strengthening both forms of microfinance in India is in the best interests of its 
citizens.  
 
Finally, the bill has languished for a while in the Parliament and subsequently been rejected. It 
is essential for the existing government to find a way to put aside populist considerations to 
ensure that the next draft of the bill gets a fair chance to be legally enforceable. The slow 
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timeline of activity on the bill is in stark contrast to the immediate bans put on the MFIs 
earlier.  
 
Recommendations for Private MFIs in India 
For their part, private MFIs can make a start by ensuring they follow the codes of conduct 
created by Sa-Dhan and MFIN in their operations. As long as they want to continue with a for-
profit model in a sector that deals with millions of poor, they should not be afraid of scrutiny. 
The private sector is known for innovation: if they used this approach to tackle the problem of 
multiple lending instead of poaching clients, it is likely that a solution could be found faster. 
Finally, if the private sector views all government intervention as an obstacle to be overcome, 
then weeding out weaknesses in the sector will be much harder. The government can 
incentivize ethical practices and penalize misbehavior, but in a sector where the clients and 
transactions number in millions in relatively remote areas, there can never be complete 
supervision. Private MFIs need to take ownership of the impact their actions have, because 
microfinance is not just a for-profit venture but also part of a broader agenda for poverty 
alleviation. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 
Progress under Microfinance - Savings of SHGs with Banks Region-wise / State-wise/ Agency-wise 
position as on 31 March 2013 (all amounts in Indian National Rupees (INR)) 
Region and 
state 
Commercial Banks 
Regional Rural 
Banks Cooperative Banks Total 
No. of 
SHGs 
Savings 
amount 
No. of 
SHGs 
Savings 
amount 
No. of 
SHGs 
Savings 
amount 
No. of 
SHGs 
Savings 
amount 
Northern Region 
Chandigarh 609 95.11 0 0 0 0 609 95.11 
Haryana 19011 1646.25 19281 2080.32 4288 304.16 42580 4030.73 
Himachal 
Pradesh 25233 2143.52 7737 1072.48 20272 1061.92 53242 4277.92 
Jammu and 
Kashmir 2854 279.08 1646 445 1296 246.41 5796 970.49 
New Delhi 3589 327.65 0 0 198 20.4 3787 348.05 
Punjab 24235 2817.91 5085 353.45 5740 464.12 35060 3635.48 
Rajasthan 92940 7734.13 56573 3272.57 82250 4754.04 231763 15760.74 
Total 168471 15043.65 90322 7223.82 114044 6851.05 372837 29118.52 
North Eastern Region 
Assam 87203 7037.21 159147 3458 24722 255.55 271072 10750.76 
Arunachal 
Pradesh 3074 155.44 1538 227.68 421 28.97 5033 412.09 
Manipur 4929 102.55 6106 110.3 1621 22.39 12656 235.24 
Meghalaya 3264 228.21 3550 245.47 2759 41.98 9573 515.66 
Mizoram 1128 46.56 1336 547.12 653 18.53 3117 612.21 
Nagaland 3219 147.36 746 13.23 4513 25.26 8478 185.85 
Sikkim 3529 79.48 0 0 NA NA 3529 79.48 
Tripura 10438 219.34 NA NA NA NA 10438 219.34 
Total 116784 8016.15 172423 4601.8 34689 392.68 323896 13010.63 
Eastern Region 
A&N Islands 925 64.68 0 0 4292 81.06 5217 145.74 
Bihar 138637 12724.83 132253 4242.81 0 0 270890 16967.64 
Jharkhand 57850 5712.25 27484 1977.67 0 0 85334 7689.92 
Odisha 206331 18181.06 242789 19431.46 73717 4215.29 522837 41827.81 
West Bengal 267132 25673.25 196558 34885.93 123131 12135.69 586821 72694.87 
Total 670875 62356.07 599084 60537.87 201140 16432.04 1471099 139325.98 
Central Region 
Chattisgarh 39281 2429.1 52497 3432.64 6715 274.22 98493 6135.96 
Madhya 
Pradesh 72436 7976.83 72897 3809.21 14124 535.15 159457 12321.19 
Uttar Pradesh 152501 23928.68 242460 14672.92 8971 599.22 403932 39200.82 
Uttarakhand 12348 2742.32 15576 1438.46 12392 582.79 40316 4763.57 
Total 276566 37076.93 383430 23353.23 42202 1991.38 702198 62421.54 
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Progress under Microfinance - Savings of SHGs with Banks 
Region-wise/ State-wise/ Agency-wise position as on 31 March 2013 (continued) 
Region and 
state 
Commercial Banks 
Regional Rural 
Banks Cooperative Banks Total 
No. of 
SHGs 
Savings 
amount 
No. of 
SHGs 
Savings 
amount 
No. of 
SHGs 
Savings 
amount 
No. of 
SHGs 
Savings 
amount 
Western Region 
Goa 6579 655.83 0 0 3310 4.91 9889 660.74 
Gujarat 118320 11442.29 58685 3942.43 31405 2170.33 208410 17555.05 
Maharashtra 297339 24349.06 89044 6443.8 301334 20577.55 687717 51370.41 
Total 422238 36447.18 147729 10386.23 336049 22752.79 906016 69586.2 
Southern Region 
Andhra 
Pradesh 1000156 222038.3 404600 30082.34 16637 2058.59 
142139
3 254179.23 
Karnataka 307657 66929.09 128645 10466.54 209393 38223.29 645695 115618.92 
Kerala 463219 40500.81 46892 1386 71214 9872.12 581325 51758.93 
Lakhswadeep 27 7.17 0 0 0 0 27 7.17 
Puducherry 12861 1110.28 3468 279.84 3724 341.46 20053 1731.58 
Tamil Nadu 638132 63731.42 61415 4392.53 173465 16842.82 873012 84966.77 
Total 2422052 394317.07 645020 46607.25 474433 67338.28 
354150
5 508262.6 
Grand Total 4076986 553257.05 2038008 152710.2 1202557 115758.2 
731755
1 
821725.4
7 
(Status of Microfinance in India: 2013-13, 2013, p. 47) 
 
Appendix 2 
SIDBI Microfinance Portfolio Outstanding Data 
Key aspects 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
SIDBI loans 
outstanding to 
MFIS as of March 
31 (amount in INR, 
crores = 10 
million) 44.31 56.01 90.93 137.76 339 550 950.38 2136.9 3808.2 
Yearly increase in 
SIDBI Loan 
outstanding to 
MFIS over 
previous year (in 
INR crores = 10 
million)   11.7 34.92 46.83 201.24 211 400.38 1186.5 1671.31 
SIDBI Yearly 
portfolio increase 
as a proportion of 
previous year 
portfolio (%)   26.4 62.34 51.5 146.09 62.24 72.8 124.85 78.21 
(Arunachalam, 2011, p. 90) 
